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Unduly Influenced Trust Revocations
Mark R. Siegel*
Lawyers learn early in law school that transactions resulting from
undue influence are not given legal effect.' Many practitioners
might even be so bold as to characterize this rule as a universal
outcome. To refute such universality, one need only look to the
case law surrounding the revocation of revocable trusts. Litigation
has arisen in connection with the revocation of trusts to resolve
the question whether the grantor, having the power to revoke,
succeeded in revoking the trust. Somewhat surprising to many
lawyers comfortable with established undue influence doctrine,
existing precedent concludes undue influence has no place in
determining whether a competent settlor can revoke a revocable
trust.2
When it comes to gratuitous property dispositions, allegations of
conduct amounting to undue influence can arise in a variety of
ways. A will's creation or subsequent revocation may be challenged
as wrongfully procured. Further, the decedent may have been
wrongfully prevented from either executing or revoking a
document. 3
Part I of this article addresses both the will and revocable trust
as vehicles to accomplish gratuitous property dispositions. Part II
analyzes the requisite mental capacity necessary to convey property
during life or upon death. Parts III and IV cover undue influence
and the use of constructive trusts as a remedial tool to rectify
cases of undue influence. The article next reviews, in Part V, the
line of cases addressing wrongful interferences with wills and
trusts, including the emerging tortious interference with an
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law.
1. The concept of undue influence originated with the courts of equity as a remedial
device. See ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTS § 4.20 (2d ed. 1990). The undue influence doctrine
developed in connection with inter vivos and testamentary gifts. Id. § 4.20 at 283 n.1.

Transactions may be set aside and the parties restored to their original positions when "one
party uses [its] dominant psychological position in an unfair manner to induce the
subservient party to consent to an agreement to which he would not otherwise have
consented." CALAmARi& PERHLo, Tiu LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9-9 (2d ed. 1977).
2.
3.

See Fla. Nat'l Bank v. Genova, 460 So. 2d 895 (Fla 1984).
See Latham v. Father Devine, 85 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1949).
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expectancy claim. Lastly, the article proposes that because of the
existence of available and adequate probate and trust remedies,
trust beneficiaries harmed as a result of actions effected through
the use of undue influence should first resort to the constructive
trust as an equitable remedy before being able to pursue tort
claims against the importuning party.
I.

GRATUrrous

DISPOSIONS THROUGH WILLS AND TRUSTS

One should not be surprised that the case reporters are filled
with wrongful actions targeted at gifts and testamentary transfers.
By tradition, the will was the legal mechanism decedents
commonly used to control the testamentary disposition of property
acquired during life.4 In more recent times, few persons would
refute that the use of revocable trusts is on the rise.5
A revocable living trust is an inter vivos trust created by the
settlor, its maker, during the settlor's life, which is revocable and
amendable by the settlor. The trustee of the revocable living trust
manages the trust property under the terms of the trust agreement
for the benefit of the trust beneficiaries. In a typical well-drafted
revocable living trust, the trust agreement addresses payments of
income and principal to the settlor during the settlor's lifetime, as
well as distribution of trust principal upon the settlor's death. The
revocable living trust replaces the settlor's will, as to the trust
assets, through the provisions addressing the disposition of
property upon the settlor's death. While these trust assets pass
outside of probate, because they are not subject to the will or
intestacy, it is incorrect to conclude revocable trusts are merely
probate avoidance devices.6 For instance, revocable inter vivos
trusts can provide significant lifetime property management
features in the event the settlor becomes incompetent.
A revocable inter vivos trust bears resemblance to both gifts and
wills. An inter vivos trust and a gift both involve the transfer of
4. Even with the traditional will setting, the will was not the exclusive method. For
example, life insurance proceeds would be paid to beneficiaries specified in the insurance
policy. Assets owned with rights of survivorship would become the property of the surviving
joint tenant.
5. Howard M. Zaritsky, Estate Tax Payment Provisions in Multiple Documents - Part
3, 26 EST. PLAN., June 1999, at 232-33; Ronald R. Volkmer, Interface of Revocable Trust and
Will, 27 EST. PLAN., January 2000, at 43; John Paul Parks, Varied Duties Face the Successor
Trustee of a Revocable Trust, 19 EST. PLAN., July/August 1992 at 203; see also DUKEMINiER &
JOHANSON, WIuS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 351 (6th ed. 2000).
6. Estate of West v. West, 948 P.2d 351, 355 (Utah 1997) (concluding revocable trust
avoids probate of trust assets).
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legal title to property. 7 With a will, title remains unaffected until
death.8 The revocable trust is valid and the beneficiaries' interests
vest as of creation, subject to divestiture.9 The revocable trust and
will, while providing for the disposition of property at death, permit
the settlor/testator to alter the beneficiary designation before death.
An individual may choose to create a revocable trust to avoid
probate, 10 to provide for incapacity," to provide for management of
assets, or to provide tax benefits. For many individuals, the benefit
of lifetime management accorded by revocable trusts provides a
broad solution to property management concerns 12 independent of
potential incapacity issues. In addition to lifetime management, the
revocable trust may provide for asset management after the
13
creator's death for the trust beneficiaries named by the creator.
4
In general, when a settlor creates a trust it is irrevocable.1 To be
revocable, the settlor must expressly enumerate the power of
revocation in the trust agreement.

are

revocable

by the settlor

5

In a minority of states, trusts

unless expressly

stated to be

irrevocable. 6 In contrast to the formal requirements attendant to
7. The donee of a gift receives both legal and equitable title. See Cleveland Trust Co.
v. White, 15 N.E.2d 627 (Ohio 1938). A trust beneficiary obtains equitable title with the
trustee having legal title to the property. Id. See also 38 C.J.S. Gifts § 9; IA ScoTT ON TRUSTS §
57.6, 189-90 (41' ed. 1987); ROUNDS, LORING: A TRUSTEE'S HANDBOOK § 5.1 (Aspen 1999).

8. Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Joy, 53 N.E.2d 113, 122 (Mass. 1944).
9. Estate of Groesbeck v. Groesbeck, 935 P2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1997); Taliaferro v.
Taliaferro, 921 P 2d 803, 811 (Kan. 1996). A beneficiary's interest would be divested in the
event the settlor validly exercised the revocation power. There seems to exist the notion that
a trust over which the grantor reserves the right to revoke has no legal significance. See
Ullman v. Garcia, 645 So. 2d 168 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1994). This idea is, at best over
simplistic, at worst, legally inaccurate. It fails to take account of the fact that legal title to
property has been conveyed and the trust beneficiaries' interests vest. Moreover, it overlooks
whether the revocable trust is funded or unfunded during the grantor's lifetime.
10. Probate avoidance is not limited to reasons of costs and delays that may be
attendant to formal probate. Individuals may also be motivated by the strong sense of
privacy obtained when documents do not have to be filed in the public records.
11. By funding the trust during the lifetime of the individual, the trustee can manage
the assets upon incapacity. It should be noted that funding need not be limited to
pre-incapacity since a spouse, attorney-in-fact (under an appropriately drafted durable power
of attorney), or possibly a conservator could make transfers after the individual becomes
incapacitated.
12. Naming a third party to serve as trustee of the revocable trust can alleviate the
administrative burdens of investment decisions, record keeping, and accounting.
13. Of course, the creator may simply have directed the trustee to distribute the trust
property outright to the named beneficiaries after the owner's death.
14. BOGERT AND BOGERT, TRUSTS § 148; McGoVERN, Kuirrz, AND REIN, WIus, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES § 5.5 (West 1988).
15. BOGERT AND BOGERT, supra note 14, at § 148; MCGOVERN, Kuirrz, AND REIN, supra
note 14, at § 5.5.
16. These states include California, CAL PROB. CODE § 15400; Oklahoma, and Texas; TEx
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the valid revocation of wills, revocable inter vivos trusts are subject
to less stringent rules. 1 Most well drafted revocable trust
agreements contain provisions concerning its revocation. 18 If the
trust agreement specifies a particular manner required for
revocation, the trust revocation is invalid unless the exercise of the
power to revoke complies with the specific manner provided.' 9 If
no specific manner is stated in the trust agreement, the settlor may
exercise the power to revoke20 in any manner sufficient to manifest
the settlor's intent to revoke.
A settlor's power to revoke a revocable trust is personal to the
settlor and may not be exercised by a successor in interest. 2' An
incompetent settlor is unable to revoke a revocable trust.2 A
conservator appointed for a settlor lacks the power to revoke the
settlor's revocable trust.23 Where the settlor has named an agent
under a power of attorney, the agent may not revoke the settlor's
trust absent specific authorization conferred on the
revocable
24
agent.
II.

CAPACITY TO MAKE GIFTS AND EXECUTE WILLS

In order for a will to make a valid testamentary disposition, it
must be executed with the requisite mental capacity. Different
mental capacity standards apply between contracts and wills. A
PROP. CODE § 112.051. See, BOGEIRT AND BOGERT, supra note 14, at § 148 n.16.
17. McGoVERN, Kumz, AND REN, supra note 14, at § 5.5.
18. A typical revocable trust clause reads:
The grantor reserves the right to alter, amend, modify or revoke this trust in whole or in
part at any time and from time to time by instrument in writing signed by the grantor and
delivered to the trustee. The trustee shall have a reasonable time after receipt of the writing
revoking the trust, in whole or in part, in which to deliver the trust property.
19. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1001 (2d ed. Rev.) (citing Underhill v. United States
Trust Co., 13 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1929)); BOGERT AND BOGERT, supra note 14, at §148; 56 FLk Jua.
2D TRUSTS § 82 (1985).
20. BOoEr AND BOGERT, supra note 14, at § 148; 56 FI. Jur- 2D TRUSTS § 82 (1985).
However, under Texas law, a trust created in writing must be revoked in writing. TEx PROP.
CODE § 112.051(c).
21. BOGEr, supra note 19, at § 1000 (citing Barlow v. Loomis, 19 F 677 (C.C. Vt.
1884)); BOGERT AND BOGERT, supra note 14, at § 148; 56 FLA JUR. 2D TRUSTS § 82 (1985).
22. Freeman v. Lane, 504 So. 2d 1297, 1300-01 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); In re Bo, 365
N.W.2d 847, 852 (N.D. 1985); Friedrich v. BancOhio Nat'l Bank, 470 N.E. 2d 467 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1984); FRATCHER, Scorr ON TRUSTS § 330 (4th ed. 1989). As the appointment of a
conservator is not an adjudication of testamentary incapacity, the ward may possess
sufficient capacity to execute a will and revoke a trust. In re Conservatorship of Bookasta,
216 Cal. App. 3d 445, 450 (1989).
23. In re Bo, 365 N.W.2d at 854.
24. See Franzen v. Norwest Bank of Colo., 955 P.2d 1018 (Colo. 1998). By statute,
enacted after the execution of the power of attorney in Franzen, Colo. Rev. Stat. §
15-14-608(2) provides that "[ain agent may not revoke or amend a trust that is revocable or
amendable by the principal without specific authority and specific reference to the trust in
the agency instrument." The statute appears to be more restrictive than Franzen in that the
decision does not require specific reference to the trust. See Kline v. Utah Dep't of Health,
776 P.2d 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding settlor's attorney-in-fact could not exercise settlor's
power of revocation after the settlor's incapacity).
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higher degree of mental competence is required for the transaction
of ordinary business and the making of contracts than is necessary
for testamentary disposition of property.2 5 Gifts, like contracts,
require greater competency than testamentary dispositions. 26 One
explanation is that "[glenerally, a grantor, unlike a testator, must
cope with another party to the transaction, that is, with a
grantee." 27 The testamentary capacity required for wills is a less
28
rigorous standard because it is a unilateral disposition of property.
To have testamentary capacity "the testator need only understand
the nature and consequences of executing a will, the nature and
extent of the property being disposed of, and the identity of the
persons who would be considered the natural objects of his bounty
and his relations to them."29 In contrast, the more exacting contract
standard, applicable to gifts, requires the person to comprehend
and understand the nature of the transaction and be capable of
making a rational judgment concerning the transaction in
question.30 The higher standard applicable to gifts reflects the
irrevocable nature the gift will have on the future31 financial security
of the donor and those dependent on the donor.
Although wills and gifts similarly may be set aside if obtained by
undue influence, there are differing undue influence presumptions
for gifts by will and inter vivos gifts. 32 Less is required to raise a
presumption of undue influence for inter vivos gifts.-' Any gift
made to a donee who bears a confidential relationship to the donor
is presumptively procured by undue influence. The same presumption does not apply to dispositions by will. In the case of
wills, there must be more than just the existence of a confidential
relationship. There must be a confidential relationship together
with an abuse of that relationship in order for the presumption to
arise?" According to one commentator.
In a number of states it is said that the equity rule that a
25. Estate of Baessler v. James, 561 N.W.2d 88, 92-93 (Iowa. Ct. App. 1997); Hamill v.
Brashear, 513 S.W. 2d 602, 607 ('rex. Ct App. 1974).
26. Legler v. Legler, 211 P.2d 233, 247 (Or. 1949); Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 624 A. 2d
405, 419 (D.C. 1991).
27. Legler, 211 P.2d at 247.
28. In re Estate of ACN, 509 N.Y.S.2d 966, 969 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (holding the
creation of a charitable remainder unitrust is a bilateral transaction and settlor's capacity to
be judged by a contract standard rather than a wills standard).
29. Rudolf Nureyev Dance Found. v. Noureeva-Francois, 7 F Supp. 2d 402, 416
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing In re Estate of Gearin, 517 N.YS.2d 339, 341 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)).
30. Rudolf Nureyev Dance Found., 7 F Supp. 2d at 416.
31. RESTATEMENT (THmiD) TRUSTS § 11, comment on subsection (3) (1996) (Tentative
Draft No. 1).
32. Anderson v. Meadowcroft, 661 A.2d 726 (Md. 1995).
33. Jan Ellen Rein-Francovich, An Ounce of Prevention: Grounds for Upsetting Wills
and Will Substitutes, 20 GONZ L REV. at 58; Langbein, Living Probate: The Conservatorship
Model, 77 McH. L REv. 63, 67 (1978).
34. Madden v. Rhodes, 626 So. 2d 608, 618 (Miss. 1993).
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presumption or inference of undue influence arises where the
party in whom trust and confidence is reposed . . . applies
only to transactions inter vivos, and does not apply to gifts by
will ... The reason which is frequently assigned for this rule
is that the testator gives only property in which his interest is
bound to cease at his death, while a gift inter vivos passes
property
which the donor would have retained but for the
35
gift.
Further, the courts have recognized that impermissible influence
applied in the gift setting may be accepted in a testamentary
setting.36 Another court explains what has become known as the
equity rule as follows:
The basis for this diametrically different rule or burden of
proof has rarely, if ever, been stated. The basis would seem to
be that it is natural and customary for a person to dispose of
his property by will, and therefore he is not unlikely to discuss
it with the principal beneficiary; whereas it is unnatural for a
person to give away a large portion of his property during his
lifetime even to one occupying a confidential relationship.
Although, to many, the Equity rule will seem the fairer and
better rule, it is too late to question or discard the rule which
has been so long established and so recently reiterated in will
37
cases.
Thus, the equity rule creates a presumption against the validity of
the gift to the donee and imposes the burden upon the recipient to
establish that the gift was freely made, i.e., in good faith and
without undue influence. 38 In contrast, for testamentary gifts there
is a suspicious
circumstances analysis rather than a presumption of
39
invalidity.

For transactions between a husband and wife, there is no
35. 3 WILIM J. Bow & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAw OF WiLs § 29.84, at
600-01 (1961).
36. One court observed:
In the cases of gifts or other transactions inter vivos, it is considered by courts of
equity, that the natural influence, which such relations as those in question involve,
exerted by those who possess it, to obtain a benefit for themselves, is an undue
influence. The law regarding wills is very different from this. The natural influence of
the parent or guardian over the child, or the husband over the wife, or the attorney
over the client, may lawfully be exerted to obtain a will or legacy, so long as the
testator thoroughly understands what he is doing, and is a free agent.
Anderson, 661 A.2d at 731 (quoting Griffith v. Diffenderffer, 50 Md. 466, 484 (1879)).
37. Williams v. McCarroll, 97 A.2d 14, 21 (Pa. 1953).
38. Oachs v. Stanton, 655 A.2d 965, 968 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (stating "this rule
was designed to protect the donor from a voluntary decision induced by the confidential
relationship the donor shares with the donee") (citing In re Dodge, 234 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1967));
Rich v. Hallman, 143 So. 292, 293 (Fla. 1932).
39. Estate of Baessler, 561 N.W.2d at 93; Shearer v. Healy, 230 A.2d 101, 108 (Md.
1967).
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presumption of undue influence arising solely from the marital
relationship. 40 To recognize a presumption between spouses would
nullify the sentiment that one spouse has a natural claim to the
other's property.
III.

UNDUE INFLUENCE

41
The precise parameters of undue influence remain elusive.
According to one commentator in addressing undue influence in a
wills context:

Most judicial definitions of undue influence speak of
domination of the testator's mind, which substitutes the
influencer's volition for that of the testator. The typical test is
whether the testator's mind was so controlled as to overpower
his free agency and to cause him to make42a will that he would
not have made if left to his own devices.
Dispositions and documents are not honored if the nominal
actor's free agency is destroyed because of the substitution of the
influencer's actions for that of the nominal actor.43 In essence, the
"professed action is not freely done but is in truth the act of the
one who procures the result."44 Common elements the courts
analyze when determining whether undue influence has been
established include:
a. Susceptibility to influence;
b. The influencer's opportunity to influence;
c. The influencer's disposition or willingness to influence;
d. A result that appears to be the product of undue
45
influence.
These elements are applied to ascertain whether the nominal
40. In re Estate of Ewers, 481 P2d 970, 973-74 (Kan. 1971); Presgrove v. Robbins, 451
P.2d 961, 971 (Okla. 1969); Warner v. Fla. Bank & Trust Co., 160 F.2d 766, 770-71 (lth Cir.
1947); see also In re McKittrick Trust, 865 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Mont. 1993). See also
Rein-Francovich, supra note 33, at 42-43 (stating that it is "[eixtremely rare for a court to
find that a confidential relationship exists between spouses even where one is clearly
dependent on the other").
41. See In re Coley, 280 S.E.2d 770 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981):
It is impossible to set forth all the various combinations of facts and circumstances
that are sufficient to make out a case of undue influence because the possibilities are
as limitless as the imagination of the adroit and the cunning. The very nature of
undue influence makes it impossible for the law to lay down tests to determine its
existence with mathematical certainty.
Id. at 772 (citing In re Will of Beale, 163 S.E. 684 (N.C. 1932)).
42. Rein-Francovich, supra note 33, at 33. See also McGovERN, Kurz, AND REiN. supra
note 14, at § 7.3 (West 1988).
43. Rein-Francovich, supra note 33, at 33; Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary
Freedom, 38 ARmz L REV. 235, 244 (1996). The undue influence doctrine is not limited to the
creation of wills. It may apply to will revocations, gifts, deeds, contracts, and trusts.
44. Loftin v. Loftin, 208 S.E.2d 670, 674-75 (N.C. 1974).
45. Rein-Francovich, supra note 33, at 35; Ray D. Madoff, Unmasking Undue
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actor's conduct and actions resulted from his own free will and
agency. 46 To establish undue influence another court states:
the influence exercised amounted to a moral coercion, which
restrained independent action and destroyed free agency, or
which, by importunity which could not be resisted,
constrained the testator to do that which was against his free
will and desire,
but which he was unable to refuse or too
47
weak to resist.
The grantor must be subjected to actions "sufficient to overpower
volition, destroy free agency, and impel
the grantor to act against
48
the grantor's inclination and free will."
A will must be executed with sufficient mental capacity in order
to be valid.49 A will whose execution is procured by undue
influence is invalid.50 As the same degree of mental capacity is
required for the revocation of a will as for its creation, a will
revocation, which is the product of undue influence, is ineffective.51
IV.

TRUSTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

The legal institution of the trust finds its origins within courts of
equity.5 2 Proceedings involving trusts are within the jurisdiction of
courts of equity.5 Equitable principles govern the beneficiary's
Influence, 81 MINN. LREv. 571, 582-83 (1997); Griffin v. Baucom, 328 S.E.2d 38, 41 (N.C. Ct.
App. 1985); see 25 Am. JUR 2D Duress and Undue Influence § 35 (1996).
46. As one court has stated:
The test of undue influence is whether the party exercised his own free agency and
acted voluntarily by the use of his own reason and judgment, which may be
determined from all the surrounding circumstances, including the relation of the
parties, the time and manner of making suggestions or giving advice, the motive, if
any, in making suggestions, and the effect upon the party so acting.
Mowrer v. Eddie, 979 P.2d 156, 162 (Mont. 1999) (quoting Frame v. Bauman, 449 P.2d 525, 532
(Kan. 1969), quoting Cersovsky v. Cersovsky, 441 P.2d 829, 833 (Kan. 1968)); Logan v. Logan,
937 P.2d 967, 972 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997).
47. Rudolf Nureyev Dance Found., 7 F. Supp. 2d at 417.
48. McPeak v. McPeak, 593 N.W.2d 180, 187 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999).
49. In re Dunn, 500 S.E.2d 99, 103 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). With respect to testamentary
capacity, it has been stated:
[dlifferent courts may define this degree of capacity in slightly different terms. As
ordinarily stated, however, the essence of what is required is that the testator be able
to understand the natural objects of his or her bounty and the nature and extent of
his or her property, and be able to understand and make decisions about how he or
she wishes to dispose of that property.
RESTATEMENT (TIRD) TRUSTS § 11, comment on subsection (1) (1996) (Tentative Draft No. 1)
(1996).
50. Estate of Auen v. Carson, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 565 (Cal. App. Ct 1994).
51. T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WIL.S § 84, § 86 (2d ed. 1953); First Citizens Bank & Trust Co.
of S.C. v. Inman, 370 S.E. 2d 99 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988) (contesting codicil revocation on undue
influence grounds).
52. BOGERT, supra note 19, at § 1. Most states no longer have separate courts of equity
and, as a result, equitable principles are applied in courts of general jurisdiction with legal
and equitable jurisdiction. Id.
53. Nayee v. Nayee, 705 So. 2d 961 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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remedies,54 and a constructive trust is one form of equitable
remedy.5 5 No rigid requirements exist for imposing a constructive
trust.6 Unduly influenced conveyances may result in having a
constructive trust imposed.57 As one commentator has noted, "the
imposition of a trust by equity will prevent the person accidentally
holding legal title from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of
another who in equity is entitled to the property."5 Another
commentator states:
A constructive trust arises where a person who holds title to
property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another
on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were
permitted to retain it.59
A person receiving property by fraud, duress, undue influence, or
violation of a duty arising out of a fiduciary relation to another may
be unjustly enriched. 60 In the words of Justice Cardozo:
A constructive trust is the formula through which the
conscience of equity finds expression. When property has been
acquired in such circumstances that the holder of the legal
title may not in good conscience retain beneficial interest,
equity converts him into a trustee . . . A court of equity in
decreeing a constructive trust is bound by no unyielding
formula. The
equity of the transaction must shape the measure
61
of relief.
Section 184 of the Restatement of Restitution imposes a
constructive trust on the property acquired by the unjustly enriched
party.62 Comment (a) to the section makes it applicable to the
situation where a decedent is, by fraud or undue influence, induced
to revoke a will.3 In situations involving improperly caused
revocations, Comment (d) provides that the person who takes the
property as a result of the'revocation "holds it upon a constructive
54. BOGERT, supra note 19, at § 870.
55. Hinson v. Hinson, 343 S.E.2d 266, 271-72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); 5 FRATCHER, supra
note 22, at § 462. "Constructive trusts (like other trusts) were historically enforced in equity."
McGOVERN, KuRTZ, AND REIN, supra note 14, at § 6.2.

56. In re Estate of Cass, 719 A.2d 595, 598 (N.H. 1998).
57. See Skidmore v. Back, 512 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct App. 1974); BOGERT, supra note 19,
at § 80; FATc ER, supra note 22, at § 462.2. "Where a person acquires property from another
by fraud, duress, or undue influence under such circumstances that a third person is entitled
to restitution from the transferee, the transferee holds the property upon a constructive trust
for the third person." RESTATEmENT OF RESTgUTION § 169.
58. BOGERT, supra note 19, at § 474.
59. FRATCHER, supra note 22, at § 462.
60. In re Estate of Cass, 719 A.2d at 598 (citing FRATCHER, supra note 22, at § 462.2).
61. Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919).
62. "Where a disposition of property by will or intestacy is procured by fraud, duress
or undue influence, the person acquiring the property holds it upon a constructive trust...."
REsTATEMENT OF RESTITTON § 184.
63. RESTATEmENT OF RESTTUmON § 184, cmt. a.
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trust for the person who would have taken under the will... if it
had not been revoked.6
Although there is no presumption of undue influence arising
strictly 'from
the marital relationship regarding transactions
between spouses, 65 a constructive trust has been imposed for the
benefit of the wronged spouse.6
V.

WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE WITH TRUST CASES

In Hoffman v. Kohns, the decedent's niece sought to have the
probate of her elderly uncle's will revoked alleging that the will had
been procured through undue influence. 67 In addition, she sought to
have the revocation of his revocable inter vivos trust invalidated on
the same grounds.6 8 The appellate court found that the evidence
established that both the will and revocation of the trust were part
of a continuing pattern of undue influence exercised by decedent's
69 As a result,
wife who was thirty years his junior.
both the will and
70
trust revocation were held invalid.
In Florida National Bank of Palm Beach v. Genova,7 Mrs.
Genova created and funded a revocable inter vivos trust naming
herself and the bank as co-trustees. She retained the income from
her trust for life and the remainder was payable, following her
death, to the Semanskees. 2 When she was 76 years old, Mrs.
73
Genova married Mark Genova who was 32 years old.
7
4
Approximately one year later they divorced. As part of the divorce
proceeding, the trial judge found one transfer of certain assets Mrs.
Genova made to her husband to be based on undue influence.75
Several months after the divorce, the Genovas remarried and Mrs.
Genova, in her husband's presence and on letterhead from his
76
restaurant, wrote a letter to the bank seeking to revoke her trust.
With knowledge of the trial court's findings in the divorce
proceeding, and doubts about the validity of the attempted trust
revocation, the trustee/bank petitioned the probate court for
instructions.7 7 Mrs. Genova filed a writ of mandamus in the circuit
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at § 184, cmt. d (1937).
See note 45 supra.
See Bohn v. Bohn, 455 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
385 So. 2d 1064 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Hoffman, 385 So. 2d at 1065.
Id. at 1068-69.
Id. at 1069.
460 So. 2d 895 (Fla. 1985).
Id. at 895-97 n.3.
Id. at 895.
Id.
Id. at 895-96.
Genova, 460 So. 2d at 896.
Id.
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court ordering the transfer of the trust funds.7 8 The Florida district
court of appeals reversed the lower court holding, which
invalidated the settlor's efforts
to revoke the trust, because of the
79
presence of undue influence.
In affirming the court of appeals, the Florida Supreme Court
concluded "the principle of undue influence ha[d] no place
in determining whether a competent settlor [could] revoke a
revocable trust."80 The court applied a control and contingent
interest analysis to support its conclusion validating the revocation
without any inquiry into the allegations of undue influence
surrounding the revocation. The retention of control through the
power to revoke, according to the court, "distinguishes the
revocable trust from the other type of conveyances in which the
principle of undue influence is applied, i.e., gifts, deeds, wills,
contracts, etc."81 Unlike the donor who relinquishes ownership of
the property to the donee at the time of a gift, the beneficiaries of
a revocable trust do not come into possession of the trust property
until the settlor's death, and their interest is contingent on the
settlor failing to exercise the power of revocation. 82 The Florida
Supreme Court then expressed its disapproval of the holding in
Hoffman.83
The Florida courts again faced the question of whether a trust
revocation was effective irrespective of undue influence in
Freeman v. Lane. 4 Mrs. Freeman created a revocable trust for
herself for life with the trust property to be distributed among her
six children after her death.85 Mrs. Freeman informed the trustee in
writing that she wished to revoke the trust, but two of Mrs.
Freeman's children told the trustee that her decision to revoke the
trust was the product of undue influence of certain other siblings.8
The trustee then sought a declaratory judgment respecting the trust
revocation and trust termination without liability.87 While the lower
court invalidated Mrs. Freeman's attempted revocation on undue
influence grounds, the court of appeals applied Genova and
reversed because that precedent held that undue influence does not
prevent revocation of a revocable trust.8
Both Genova and Freeman involved trust revocation challenges
78.
settlor's
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. A trust officer for the bank was aware of the undue influence finding in the
divorce proceeding. Id.
Id.
Id.
Genova, 460 So. 2d at 897.
Id.
Id. at 897-98.
504 So. 2d 1297 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
Freeman, 504 So. 2d at 1298.
Id.

87.

Id.

88.

Id. at 1300.
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while the settlor was alive. However, by disagreeing with the result
in, and expressly rejecting the holding of, Hoffman, Genova
suggests that undue influence challenges to trust revocations will
meet defeat whether brought during the settlor's life or after death.
Based on the Florida Supreme Court's reasoning in Genova, one
commentator has suggested that undue influence may likewise be
irrelevant in the creation of a trust.89 This conclusion follows from
the Florida Supreme Court's statement that the named beneficiaries
of a revocable trust have interests contingent on the settlor not
revoking the trust.90 Similarly, potential trust beneficiaries' interests
are contingent on the grantor's power to create the trust. 91
A.

Post Florida National Bank of Palm Beach County v. Genova
Developments

In Paananen v. Kruse,m the decedent's will and revocable trust
were challenged on the grounds of undue influence after his
death. 93 The court of appeals upheld the trial judge in revoking the
revocable trust created under undue influence. 94 The court
distinguished Genova because the settlor had died and the trust
"ripened into a testamentary disposition." 95
In Ullman v. Garcia,96 the appellate court held that during the
settlor's lifetime the guardian of an incapacitated settlor could not
contest the validity of a revocable Totten trust created by the
97
settlor before incapacity on the basis of undue influence.
Paananen, and its reliance on Genova, and a Florida Statute
assisted the court of appeals. 98 Consistent with the statute, both
Paananenand ULlman permit allegations of undue influence in the
creation of a revocable trust to be raised in actions commenced
after the settlor's death.
The premises underlying Genova, a revocable trust is unique and
89. Englehardt, In Terrorem Inter Vivos: Terra Incognita, 26 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE
AND TRUST JOURNAL, 535, 546 (1991).
90. Id. at 546.
91. Id.
92. 581 So. 2d 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
93. The beneficiaries named in the settlor's 1985 will challenged the settlor's 1987 inter
vivos trust. Paananen,581 So. 2d at 187.
94. Id. at 188.
95. Id. Allegations of undue influence were the only way the estate might regain
control of the assets. Id. The allegations involved trust creation rather than trust revocation.
96. 645 So. 2d 168 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1994).
97. Ullman, 645 So. 2d at 170.
98. The Florida statutes on the effect of undue influence and trust contests provides:
A trust is void if the execution is procured by fraud, duress, mistake, or undue
influence. Any part of the trust is void if so procured, but the remainder of the trust
not so procured is valid if it is not invalid for other reasons. An action to contest the
validity of all or part of a trust may not be commenced until the trust becomes
irrevocable.
RA STAT. ANN. §§ 737.206, 737.2065 (2000) (emphasis added).
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unlike other transfers by gift or will and the right to revoke is
absolute, are at odds with precedent not addressed by the Genova
court. As one commentator has noted when comparing revocable
trusts and wills, "[u]nder either the trust or the will, the interest of
the beneficiaries is both revocable and ambulatory."99 Either the
creation' °° or revocation 0 1 of a will may be challenged on undue
influence grounds. Like undue influence in the making of a will, the
exercise of undue influence in procuring the revocation of a will
invalidates the revocation.' ° While revocable trusts and wills
similarly provide for the disposition of property upon death, the
symmetrical application of undue influence to either the creation or
revocation of wills is inapplicable to the creation and revocation of
revocable trusts under Genova. Moreover, if the revocable trust is
analogized to inter vivos gifts, as both are conveyances of legal
title, gifts that are the product of undue influence of the donee or a
third person are invalid and may be set aside.'03
B. Intentional Interference with an Expected Gift or Inheritance
°4 appellant's stepmother created a
In Davison v. Feuerherd,1
revocable trust with assets she had received from her husband,
appellant's father. The settlor thereafter formed an intention to
name appellant as trust remainder beneficiary and had her attorney
prepare a trust amendment to that effect. 10mAppellant alleged that
the appellees improperly prevented the settlor from signing the
amendment. 1°6 Although the appellees succeeded at trial, on appeal
99. John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and Future Laws of Succession, 97
HARv. L. REv. 1108, 1113 (1984); Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Boston, 53 N.E.2d at 122
(distinguishing feature of testamentary disposition is its ambulatory nature until death of
maker).
100. See Sangster v. Dillard, 925 P.2d 929 (Or. Ct App. 1996); In re Estate of Dankbar,
430 N.W.2d 124, (Iowa 1988); Estate of Auen, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 557, 565 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994);
Estate of Molera, 100 Cal. Rptr. 696 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972); see also CAL PROB. CODE § 6104
(stating that the execution or revocation of a will or a part of a will is ineffective to the
extent the execution or revocation was procured by duress, menace, fraud, or undue
influence); Fi.& STAT. ANN. § 731.08 (dictating a will is void if the execution thereof is
procured by Traud, duress, mistake, menace or undue influence. Likewise, any part of a will
is void if so procured, but the remainder of the will not so procured shall be valid if the
same is not invalid for other reasons).
101. See Smith v. Moore, 176 So. 2d 868 (Ala. 1965); Estate of Evans v. Priebe, 80
N.W.2d 127 (Neb. 1956); Black v. Black, 240 S.W.2d 458 (Tex. App. 1951); Matter of Dunn, 500
S.E.2d 99 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998). CAL PROB. CODE § 6104 provides "[t]he execution or
revocation of a will or a part of a will is ineffective to the extent the execution or revocation
was procured by duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence." FL. STAT. ANN. § 731.09
provides "[ilf the revocation of a will, or any part thereof, is procured by fraud, duress,
menace or undue influence, such revocation shall be void."
102. See 79 AM. JUR. 2D Wilts § 508 (1975).
103. 25 An. JuR. 2D Duress and Undue Influence § 35 (1996); 38A C.J.S. Gifts § 33

(1996).
104.
105.
106.

391 So. 2d 799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
Id. at 800.
Id.
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the court recognized a tortious interference action through the
appellant's expectation of being a beneficiary of a revocable trust.10 7
The appellate court stated:
with regard to tortious interference claims, no real distinction
exists between gifts of inheritance through a will and gifts
through a revocable trust. Both forms of giving create only an
expectancy in the beneficiary and, in both forms, the donor
has the privilege of changing his mind ... It is the expectancy
and both wills
status to which this theory of liability applies,
08
and revocable trusts create expectancies.
While Davison concerned allegations of interference through
undue influence with an amendment to a revocable trust,
Hammons v. Eisert,09 a case factually similar to Genova,
addressed alleged undue influence in causing a settlor of a
revocable trust to revoke the trust. The Hammons court held:
the beneficiary of a revocable written trust has a cause of
action, at least after the death of the settlor, against a person
who, by the exercise of undue influence induces a settlor to
revoke the trust and thereby diverts all or part of the trust
funds and prevents the beneficiary from receiving that which
he would otherwise have received." 0
Thus undue influence exerted to remove a named beneficiary, or to
prevent a beneficiary from being named, is actionable.
Both of the cases mentioned above permit a tortious interference
action to be brought after death but the question arises whether an
action can be brought before death. Harmon v. Harmon"' was the
first case to recognize a wrongful interference action to be brought
prior to the testator's death. In that case, the son and expectant
legatee of his mother's future estate alleged that his brother and his
wife improperly induced his mother to make inter vivos gifts to
them." 2 Prior to its decision in Harmon, the Maine Supreme Court
faced a similar question involving wrongfully induced gifts affecting
an expected bequest. In Cyr v. Cote," 3 the Supreme Court of Maine
permitted the tort claim for damages where it was brought after
the testator's death. As a result, Harmon extended recognition of
the cause of action to actions commenced while the testator is
alive and able, at any time before death, to will the property to
someone else.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 802.
Id.
745 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
Id. at 254.
404 A.2d 1020 (Me. 1979).
Id. at 1021-22.
396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1979).
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In Carlton v. Carlton,114 the court of appeals followed the lead of

Harmon and allowed an action to be maintained during the
testator's lifetime."' The Carlton court faced a unique situation
because the alleged tortfeasor had died while the testators were
alive, and, to not allow the plaintiff to bring the lawsuit while the
the
testators were living put the plaintiff at risk of forever losing
6
cause of action because of the state probate claims statute."
The ability to bring a tortious interference action while the
grantor is alive may seem to be contradictory to notions of
freedom to change one's mind about beneficiaries named in a will
(or trust for that matter). Such freedom is predicated on the
absence of wrongful interference. Several considerations support
recognition of a lifetime cause of action, including: (1) the alleged
injury occurs during the testator's life; (2) the testator's testimony
is available; and (3) 17the availability of other witnesses whose
memories are fresher."
VI. PROPOSED REDRESS FOR THE WRONGFUL INTERFERENCE SCENARIO:
AVAILABLE RELIEF IN PROBATE OR TRUST PROCEEDINGS IN LIEU OF TORT

ACTION

Although the tortious interference action was recognized in Cyr
and extended in Harmon, both decisions notably mention a8
constructive trust as an appropriate alternative remedy"

Moreover, both decisions cite the famous case of Latham v. Father
Divine."9 In Latham, the will beneficiary wrongfully prevented the
testator from

revoking

the will, and the

court imposed

a

constructive trust in favor of the intended beneficiary even though
there was no duly executed will or draft naming the intended
beneficiary. 20 Wrongful interference in causing the revocation of a
trust naming others as beneficiary provides an even more
compelling case in which to impose a constructive trust. Unlike the

oral testimony in Latham, as to whom the testator sought to name
as beneficiary, the trust agreement itself serves as written evidence
of the 21settlor's intent to provide for the named beneficiaries after
death.'
114. 575 So. 2d 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
115. Id. at 241-42.
116. Id.
117. Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1022, 1025. See Moore, At the Frontierof ProbateLitigation:
Intentional Interference with the Right to Inherit, 7 PRoB. & PROP 6 (November/December
1993) and Note, Intentional Interference with Inheritance, 30 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE &
TRuST JOURNAL 325 (1995).
118. Harmon, 404 A.2d at 1025; Cyr, 396 A.2d at 1018.
119. 85 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1949).
120. Id. at 169. Further, the intended beneficiary was not an heir. Id. at 171.
121. Without the wrongful interference, prior to death the settlor would of course be
free to leave the property to someone else by naming new beneficiaries or revoking the
entire trust.
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In Brandin v. Brandin,122 the decedent, after marrying his
second wife, amended his revocable trust to increase the share of
property his new wife would receive upon his death. Following
their father's death, the children brought a tortious interference
action claiming decedent's second wife unduly influenced the trust
amendment. Reasoning from principles relating to the ability to
bring a tortious interference action in the wills context and
recognition of actions to set aside trusts as the products of undue
influence, the appellate court stated:
[wie believe the court's policy behind requiring plaintiffs to
seek redress through other available and adequate forums, as
it does with respect to wills in the probate court, correctly
and logically extends to requiring plaintiffs to seek redress
through courts of equity for challenges to express trusts. Just
as "the probate code . . . purports to provide the exclusive
forum for such matters," ]urisdiction over trusts has always
been regarded as one of equity's original and inherent powers
... . An action to set aside the trust, with the necessary will
contest (discussed infra), gave children an adequate remedy.
We find that where, as here, plaintiffs can receive an adequate
remedy through already existing and appropriate remedies, a
tortious interference with inheritance expectancy claim-and
its attendant potential for abuse-will not lie. 123
Probate can provide an adequate remedy for will executions and
revocations caused by undue influence. For example, if the
contested will were found to result from undue influence, the
property would pass by the terms of the prior will or by intestacy
if there were no prior will. In contrast, there is no remedy in the
probate court for preventing either the execution or revocation of a
will. For example, if a decedent were improperly prevented from
executing a will, no will exists, and, there would be no probate
124
remedy to rectify the property from passing by intestacy.
Similarly, if a testator were wrongfully prevented from revoking an
existing will, the probate court cannot remedy the lack of
equity may
revocation. Where probate fails to provide a remedy,
125
provide a remedy by means of a constructive trust.
Tortious interference claims originated to protect business
122. 918 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
123. Id. at 840 (quoting McMullin v. Borgers, 761 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that "[wihere ... a will contest provides essentially the same remedy and prevents
any additional damages... an action for tortious interference will not lie").
124. With respect to the limits of probate, it has been stated: "Probate can strike from
the will something that is in it as a result of fraud but cannot add to the will a provision that
is not there nor can the probate court bring into being a will which the testator was
prevented from making and executing by fraud." PARKER & BowLEs, PAGE ON WUiS § 14.8.
125. Another possible alternative is a tort action for damages against the wrongdoer.
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relations or commercial expectancies, but have also been extended
to non-commercial expectancies. 126 The wrongful interference with
an expected gift or inheritance has been recognized as a tort in
many jurisdictions. 127 The doctrine has been expanded to cover
situations beyond gifts and wills. The tort has been applied to
non-probate transfers. For example, it has been applied in favor of
revocable trust beneficiaries' 28 and life insurance beneficiaries. 29 In
fact, the Restatement (2d) Torts provides:
One who by fraud, duress or other tortious means
intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third
person an inheritance or gift that he would otherwise have
received is subject to liability to the other for loss of the
inheritance or gift.13°
To succeed with a tort action for wrongful interference, the injured
party must establish: (a) the existence of an expectancy; (b)
intentional interference with that expectancy; (c) the interference
must be "conduct tortious in itself, such as fraud, duress or undue
influence;"13' (d) a reasonable certainty that the expectancy would
have been received without the interference; and (e) damages. 132 In
recognizing the tort action, however, many courts have stated that
the wronged party must either have exhausted probate remedies or
show the inadequacy of probate remedies before an action in tort
can be brought. 1"
126. PROSSER & KEETON ON ToRTS, § 130 (5th ed. 1984); HARPER, JAmES, & GRAY, LAWS OF
ToRTs, Vol. 2, § 6.11 (2d ed.); Note, Intentional Interference with Inheritance,30 REAL PROP.
PROB. & T J. 325 (1995).
127. See Mitchell v. Langley, 85 S.E. 1050 (Ga 1915), Davison v. Feuerherd, 391 So. 2d
799 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Nemeth v. Banhalmi, 425 N.E.2d 1187, 1190 (111.App. Ct. 1981);
Frohwein v. Haesemeyer, 264 N.W.2d 792, 795 (Iowa 1978); Cyr, 396 A.2d at 1018; King v.
Acker, 725 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1987); DeWitt v. Duce, 599 F2d 676 (5th Cir. 1979). See
also Holt v. First Natl Bank of Mobile, 418 So. 2d 77, 79 (Ala. 1982).
128. See Davison, 391 So. 2d at 799 (recognizing action for tortious interference by
revocable trust beneficiaries); Hammons v. Eisert, 745 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(involving beneficiaries of revocable trust suing third party alleging undue influence on trust
settlor).
129. See Mitchell, 85 S.E. at 1050.
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORmS § 774(B).
131. Nemeth, 425 N.E.2d at 1191. The tortious interference with an expectancy claim
does not authorize an independent action for undue influence of duress. Cyr, 396 A.2d at
1019 n.7.
132. Doughty v. Morris, 871 P.2d 380 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994) (involving sister suing her
brother alleging tortious interference with her prospective inheritance from her mother); In
re Estate of Knowlson, 562 N.E.2d 277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (involving sisters who brought an
action alleging another sister wrongfully interfered with their expectancies from their mother
by causing gifts and a will to be made in favor of the other sister).
133. See Smith v. Chatfield, 797 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (deciding heirs who
successfully contested decedents will were not permitted to bring subsequent tortious
interference action against attorney); McMullin, 761 S.W.2d at 718 (holding beneficiary
named in first will who failed to file a will contest precluded from bringing an action for
tortious interference with inheritance); Robinson v. First State Bank of Monticello, 454
N.E.2d 288 (Ill. 1983); DeWitt v. Duce, 408 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1981) (concluding beneficiaries
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By analogy to wills, there are available and adequate remedies
available to provide relief to undue influence challenges against
either the execution or revocation of revocable trusts. A revocable
trust created as the result of undue influence exerted on the settlor
may be challenged by bringing an action to have the trust set
aside.'3 A similar challenge should be available to contest a
revocation brought about through undue influence. Improperly
causing the creation or revocation of a revocable trust differs from
improperly preventing the creation or revocation of a revocable
trust.
In Paananen, which was a trust procured through undue
influence scenario, the court pointed out the importance of
allowing an undue influence allegation because it was the only way
for the estate to regain control of the assets. 135 Allegations of undue
influence in causing a revocable trust to be revoked present a very
different scenario. Rather than being outside of probate with the
trist created under undue influence, the assets of the improperly
revoked trust become part of the probate estate unless
subsequently transferred or consumed during life by the settlor.
The beneficiaries, who would have otherwise received the trust
assets upon the settlor's death if the revocation had not occurred,
may bring what is essentially an action to enforce the trust. In this
way the executor can distribute the former trust assets, now in
probate, to the parties who would have otherwise received them
but for the wrongful interference. In probate court, the wronged
beneficiaries can seek to have the court set aside the transfers
from the trust and impose a constructive trust on these assets so
they can be distributed in accordance with the terms of the trust
agreement. Any trust assets distributed to takers other than those
named as trust beneficiaries would be subject to a constructive
trust, with the takers holding as constructive trustees for the trust
beneficiaries.
who chose to take under will rather than contest it were precluded from bringing a claim for
tortious interference with inheritance rights). See also Soehnel, Liability in Damages for
Interference with Expected Inheritance or Gift, 22 A.L.R. 4d' 1229 § 4 (1983).
134. See Brandin v. Brandin, 918 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996). If the trust is set-aside
on the grounds it was procured by undue influence, the assets become part of the probate
estate and will pass by will, if one exists, or by intestacy. See Paananen,581 So. 2d at 186
(invalidating revocable trust after settlor's death due to undue influence in its procurement).
With regard to the rescission of a trust whose creation was induced by fraud, duress, or
undue influence, a leading commentator states:
In such case the same principles apply as apply to outright gifts. These grounds for
rescission or reformation are not peculiar to the law of trusts, although they are not
infrequently applied to the creation of trusts. To the extent to which an outright gift
can be set aside, a conveyance in trust can be set aside; to the extent to which an
absolute devise or bequest can be set aside, a devise or bequest in trust can be set
aside.
FRATCHER, supra note 22, at § 333 at 396.
135. Paananen,581 So. 2d at 188.

2002

Unduly Influenced Trust Revocations

Through the manipulation of causing the settlor to revoke a trust,
the disposition of the assets once governed by the trust instrument
does not automatically end up in the hands of the influencer. These
former trust assets, at death, pass according to the will, if one
exists, or by intestacy if no will exists. Of course, the assets could
also be the subject of lifetime gifts. Therefore, in all likelihood, the
influencer would also need to be involved with these other
gratuitous dispositions. However, with the assets displaced from
the trust, appropriate probate remedies exist to review these
transactions. In this manner, and without necessarily having to look
to a tort action, the court can redress the wrong by imposing a
constructive trust in order to put the parties in the position they
would have been had the wrong not taken place.
Suppose gifts of the former trust assets were induced following
the revocation of the trust. Both cases and commentators recognize
the availability of the tort action in connection with improperly
induced inter vivos transfers. However, the alternative remedies
approach would seem, in many instances, to preclude a tort action.
While the donor was alive and competent, the donor could seek to
have the transfer set aside. '3 6 If the donor ceased to be competent,
an incompetency proceeding could be brought to have a guardian
or conservator appointed who could seek to have the gift set
aside. 37 After the donor's death, the personal representative of the
donor's estate, or beneficiaries of the donor's will, can bring an
action to set the gift aside.-1 Therefore, in allowing a tort action,
courts may be too quick in assuming matters to be outside of
either a probate or trust proceeding. These courts may have been
guided by general principles that gifts and assets placed in
revocable inter vivos trusts are not probate assets and are not
subject to estate administration. The injured parties may be able to
bring an action in probate or a separate trust action. In either
event, available and adequate remedies should preclude the damage
136. See Mowrer v. Eddie, 979 P.2d 156 (Mont. 1999) (involving principal who executed
durable power of attorney successfully challenged on undue influence grounds
attorneys-in-fact's gifts to themselves); Oachs v. Stanton, 655 A.2d 965 (NJ. Super. Ct. App.
1995) (dealing with donor who brought an action to set aside an inter-vivos transfer of her
home to donee); Hicks v. Hicks, 491 So. 2d 346 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (involving grantor
who brought action against grantees to set aside a warranty deed).
137. See Bryant v. Lawshe, 659 So. 2d 117 (Ala. 1995) (involving conservator of
incapacitated ward bringing suit to set aside ward's inter vivos property transfer); Robertson
v. Robertson, 654 P.2d 600 (Okla. 1982) (involving incompetent's guardian bringing an action
to impose constructive trust on real estate); Majorana v. Constantine, 318 So. 2d 185 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
138. See Logan v. Logan, 937 P.2d 967 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997) (involving brother, as
executor of his deceased parents' estate, who sued his brother and sister-in-law to set aside
inter-vivos transfer parents made to them); Estate of Baessler v. James, 561 N.W 2d 88 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1997) (dealing with decedent's grandchildren who brought an action to set aside
decedent's inter vivos transfer of assets and will); Reynolds v. Molitor, 440 A.2d 192 (Conn.
1981).
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action in tort.
Brandin is the first court to use the availability of alternative
remedies approach in determining whether trust beneficiaries may
bring a tortious interference action. In Davison and Hammons,
former beneficiaries of revocable trusts were permitted to bring
tort actions for interference with the expectation of being a
revocable trust beneficiary. Davison involved an amendment to the
trust' 3

and Hammons concerned the revocation of the trust.

Neither decision employed the availability of alternative remedies
analysis, even though most jurisdictions prohibited a tortious
interference with a gift or inheritance action unless a probate
action was unavailable or inadequate. The Restatement of Torts, in
recognizing the tort action, contains commentary acknowledging
the existence of situations where a restitutionary remedy, such as a
constructive trust or an equitable lien, is proper.4 0
A constructive trust is an equitable remedy and the body of law
governing trusts developed with the courts of equity. By accepting
the tort action for damages, the courts have shifted from equitable
to legal relief despite equity being the traditional domain for trust
matters. There has been a not so subtle shift from an assets action
to a damages action. Where the constructive trust provides an
adequate remedy, the damage action should be precluded. The
constructive trust would apply to the property or the proceeds of
the property in the event the property were sold or exchanged.
While it would seem that many of the same facts potentially apply
to both a constructive trust action and a tort action for damages,
plaintiffs should not be able to pursue the more lucrative damage
option in cases where a constructive trust can provide them with
what they would have received absent the wrongful interference.
As one commentator has noted:
If the party injured by the fraud is one who would otherwise
have been a legatee and the fraud took the form of inducing
the testator to omit a gift to the aggrieved party and to include
a gift to the party practicing the fraud, rejecting the
fraudulently procured gift at probate would be ineffective to
pass the property to the harmed party. Probate can strike from
139. See Martin v. Martin, 687 So. 2d. 903 (Fla- Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (involving sons who
sued their father's second wife alleging that she wrongfully interfered with their inheritance
rights through trust amendments reducing the amounts they would receive from their
father).
140. The commentary to section 774B provides, in part:
If, however, the defendant has himself acquired the benefits of the legacy or gift, he is
unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff and a remedy is also afforded in
restitution. This may consist of holding the wrongdoer to a constructive trust,
imposing an equitable lien or subjecting him to a simple monetary judgment to the
extent of the benefits thus tortiously acquired.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 774B cmt. e (1977).
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the will something that is in it as a result of fraud but cannot
add to the will a provision that is not there nor can the
probate court bring into being a will which the testator was
prevented from making and executing by fraud. In such cases,
since the remedy in the probate proceeding is inadequate,
relief should be granted either in the form of a constructive
trust, by permitting the fraudulent gift to stand and holding
the defrauder, to whom legal title passes, as constructive
trustee for the victim of the fraud, or by giving the aggrieved
party an action at law for damages against the defrauder."'
As probate actions are the preferred method for resolving will
issues,142 so too should courts of equity and equitable remedies be
the preferred method for the resolution of trust matters. In the
context of trust disputes, courts need to be more careful in
analyzing and crafting remedies within existing and established
guidelines before resorting to legal actions for damages.
After learning of undue influence allegations, the trustee in
Genova petitioned for instructions and the trustee in Freeman
sought a declaratory judgment. In both cases, the trustees' actions
were consistent with its duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries'43 and
are to be lauded not faulted. In an effort to carry out its fiduciary
duty, the trustee in Genova believed the attempted trust revocation
was without legal effect when the facts suggested the settlor's
exercise of the power of revocation may have resulted from the
exercise of undue influence. The trustee was not seeking relief of
its fiduciary duties. 44 To the contrary, the Genova court provided
such relief on its own. To trustees, whether corporate or otherwise,
this may come as welcome news to learn that less is required of
them as a consequence of Genova. However, if allegations of undue
influence are to be ignored in connection with trust revocations,
the Genova decision fails to encourage the responsible actions
taken by the trustees. Further, Genova appears to relieve the
trustee from any responsibility to make inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the settlor's actions targeted at trust
revocation. Cloud v. United States National Bank, 45 a decision
predating Genova but not cited in Genova, concluded that a trustee
has a duty to inquire into the existence of undue influence or
incompetency and is liable to the trust beneficiaries if it knew or
141.
142.

1 BowE-PARKER, PAGE ON WuIS, § 14.8 at 706-07 (rev. 1961).
Q
Note, Intentional Interference with Inheritance, 30 REAL PROP., PROB. & TP J. at

340.
143. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS §§ 170, 206; BOGERT, supra note 19, at § 543; BOGERT
AND BOGERT, supra note 14, § 95.
144. For example, the trustee was not defending an action brought by beneficiaries for
breach of its duty. Thus, the case did not involve any assertion that no such duty was owed
to the beneficiaries.
145. 570 P.2d 350 (Or. 1977).
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should have known of the incompetency of, or undue influence
exerted upon, the settlor.146 Thus, the proper steps the trustee
should follow if the revocation of the revocable trust 47is effected
through the use of undue influence becomes less clear.1
The law is well settled that a trustee has a duty of loyalty. A
trustee's duty requires administering the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiary.148 If the trust has multiple beneficiaries, the
trustee, pursuant to the duty of impartiality, must not favor one
beneficiary over another.149 In Cloud, the beneficiaries sued the
trustee for making transfers to the elderly settlor in accordance
with instructions mailed to the trustee. The trustee was held liable
for the transfers under the invalid instructions when it knew or
should have known of the settlor's incompetence and undue
influence. The evidence showed that settlor's granddaughter while
in the back seat of a car with the settlor lying down and unable to
speak had placed the settlor's thumbprint on the instruction letter.
The trustee in Genova, knowing of the unduly influenced
transfers in the divorce proceeding, acted with proper regard for its
fiduciary duty and sought instructions concerning the settlor's
requested revocation of the trust and withdrawal of trust funds.
Despite facts suggesting the cloud surrounding the revocation
instruction, the court makes any inquiry by the trustee into the
facially valid instruction irrelevant. According to the court, the only
concerns of the trustee are: (1) whether the settlor has the power
to revoke; and (2) whether that power has been validly exercised. 15°
The resulting rule creates a disparity with acts of trust creation
that are capable of being set aside based on invalidating causes of
fraud, undue influence, or mental incompetence. Duly executed
wills and revocable trusts can be unilaterally revoked. The Genova
rule is also contrary to will revocations being set aside when
procured through the exercise of undue influence. The court fails
to adequately explain why an unduly influenced trust revocation
should be valid when an unduly influenced trust is invalid. The
Genova court, rather than the trustee, abrogated part of the
fiduciary duty of the trustee when it concluded "the trustee's duties
to conserve the trust property and manage it wisely for the benefit
of the beneficiaries who will receive the trust property at the
settlor's death, ends when the settlor exercises his or her right to
revoke."151
146. Cloud, 570 P.2d at 355-56. Under this standard, a finding of undue influence does
not subject the trustee to automatic liability.
147. Zaritsky, The Use of Revocable Trusts: The Debate Continues, 15 PROBATE NOTEs
244, 245 (1989).
148.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRUSTS § 170.

149.
150.
151.

Id. at § 183.
Genova, 460 So. 2d at 897.
Id.
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The terms of trust revocation are strictly applied. If the revocable
trust specifies a method of revocation, these provisions must be
followed in order to bring about a valid revocation. 152 In the event
the revocable trust fails to specify any particular method of
revocation, the trust may be revoked in any manner sufficiently
manifesting the settlor's intention to revoke. 15 The Genova court
failed to follow the valid exercise prong of its two-part test. A
settlor who is unduly influenced to revoke a trust can hardly be
treated as sufficiently manifesting an intention to revoke. Under
such circumstances, the exercise of the power of revocation is not
the valid act of the settlor but the act of the influencing party.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Settlor creates a revocable trust and names settlor as income
beneficiary for life. After the settlor/income beneficiary dies, the
trustee is to distribute the trust property to named beneficiaries.
The beneficiaries named as takers following the settlor's death have
an equitable interest created at the time the trust comes into
existence although enjoyment of the interest is postponed until the
settlor's death and although the interest may be divested by the
settlor's exercise of the power of revocation.'1 Should the settlor
purport to revoke the trust, whether the settlor's decision to revoke
the trust is the product of undue influence should make a
difference in determining the effectiveness of the revocation.
Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case in light of Genova.
While courts have permitted wronged trust beneficiaries to
proceed with damage actions in tort, these beneficiaries should be
required to pursue available and adequate trust and probate
remedies before being able to proceed in tort. The equitable
restitutionary remedy of the constructive trust is in keeping with
the equitable origins of trusts and is an effective tool to restore the
trust beneficiaries to the position they would have been in with
respect to the trust assets if no wrong had been committed. In
situations where the constructive trust cannot restore the status
quo, a tortious interference action may be warranted. For example,
to the extent the trust property were consumed or otherwise
dissipated or wasted, a tort action would be necessary to make the
trust beneficiaries whole.

152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TRusTS § 330.
153. Id. at § 330 cmt. i.
154. See Estate of Groesbeck v. Groesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1997); Taliaferro
v. Taliaferro, 921 P. 2d 803, 811 (Kan. 1996); Scorr ON TRUSTS § 57.6 (4th ed. 1987).

